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Most discussions of the EU’s development agenda that emphasize the social 
dimension of globalisation in general or labour rights and standard in particular tend 
to focus on either trade agreements or aid. However, in 1999, the EU explicitly linked 
migration to its development objectives, and in 2011, the European Commission 
launched the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM), which lists 
‘maximizing the development impact of migration and mobility’ as one of its four 
pillars. A distinctive feature of the GAMM’s approach is that migrants are placed at 
the centre and their human rights are to be mainstreamed throughout the migration 
cycle.   
 
To what extent is the GAMM’s commitment to migrants rights being put into 
practice? How does the GAMM’s emphasis on migrant’s rights impact upon 
development?  Using the recently adopted Seasonal Workers Directive as my focus, I 
will attempt to address these questions.  First, I will examine the extent to which the 
Directive protects migrant workers’ human rights and ensures that they have access 
to meaningful labour standards.  Second, I will explore the extent to which the 
Directive facilitates circular migration, which is seen as a key component of 
development-oriented migration.  Third, I will consider the relationship between this 
Directive and Mobility Partnerships, which are the EU’s key instruments for linking 
migration to development, when it comes to migrant workers rights and circular 
migration.  
 







1  INTRODUCTION 
 
Most discussions of the EU’s development agenda that emphasize the social 
dimension of globalization in general or labour rights and standards in particular tend 
to focus on either trade agreements or aid.
1
 In part, this emphasis was based on the 
assumption that migration and development were inimical; the idea was that once a 
country began to develop its citizens would no longer continue to migrate to more 
economically advanced countries. However, the relationship between development 
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and migration is more complex,
2
 and in 1999, two years after it obtained competence 
over immigration matters under the Amsterdam Treaty, the EU explicitly linked 
migration to its development objectives.
3
 Since 2000 the so-called migration-
development-nexus has become a popular concept, first, with international institutions 
concerned with the social side of development, such as the United Nations (UN) and 
International Labour Organization (ILO), and, then, amongst national and 
transnational policy makers. Properly managed circular migration programmes are 
seen as triple win solutions for low-income sending countries, high-income receiving 
countries, and for the migrants themselves.  
In 2005, the EU published a Communication on Migration and Development that 
emphasized the need to make migration work for development, after which the 
Council adopted the Global Approach to Migration (GAM).
4
 The GAM introduced 
Mobility Partnerships, which are intended to facilitate remittances, engage diasporas, 
and promote circular migration, as the main tool for managed temporary migration 
with third countries. At the same time, the EU launched its legal migration strategy.  
However, the two strands ran on parallel tracks, which sometimes intertwined, but 
rarely intersected, until 2010 when the European Commission proposed a directive on 
seasonal migrant workers from countries outside of the EU, which it justified as, 
among other things, being development friendly and rights-based. The following year, 
the European Commission launched the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility 
(GAMM),
5
 which lists ‘maximizing the development impact of migration and 
mobility’ as one of its four pillars.6 A distinctive feature of the GAMM’s approach is 
that migrants are placed at the centre and their human rights are to be mainstreamed 
throughout the migration cycle.  
The focus of this paper is on how low-skilled (as determined by the host country) 
migration from third countries fits into two of the GAMM four pillars
7
 – legal 
migration and maximizing the development impact of migration. I will examine the 





  My reasons for focusing on it are twofold: first, unlike Mobility Partnerships, 
which are soft instruments, the Directive is legally binding on all Member States, and, 
second, through its successive incarnations the Directive became more migrant-
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centred and rights-based. My goal is to use the Seasonal Workers Directive to explore 
the reality, rather than simply the rhetoric, of the EU’s commitment to rights-based 
and migrant-centred circular migration as part of its development strategy. In this way 
I hope to illuminate the linkages between the first and last pillars of the GAMM.  
 
My analysis proceeds in three steps.  I begin by situating the EU’s embrace of the 
migration development nexus in two contexts: international institutions committed to 
promoting the social dimension of development and the EU’s increased competence 
over migration. After establishing these contexts, I describe the evolution in the EU’s 
approach to migration and development, which shifted from a tepid commitment to 
migration as a form of economic development, to the embrace of a more robust 
rhetoric that emphasizes a migrant-centred and rights-based approach that facilitates 
circular migration. This evolution is linked to the emergence of the EU’s competence 
over immigration controls, which are those provisions having to do with the 
conditions of entry and requirements and entitlements of stay for third-country 
nationals. I examine whether, and if so, how the Seasonal Workers Directive’s 
capacity to promote circular migration and to protect the rights of migrant workers 
shifted over the more than three years of negotiations that led to its adoption. I 
conclude by suggesting what the Seasonal Workers’ Directive reveals about the EU’s 
commitment to migration as a form of development with a social dimension.  
 
 
2  CONTEXT FOR THE EU’S EMBRACE OF MIGRATION AS A 
DIMENSION OF DEVELOPMENT  
 
2.1  The Migration/Development Nexus and the Central Role of Circular 
Migration 
 
Despite the controversial assumptions regarding the relationship between migration 
and development,
9
 migration is no longer seen as a symptom of development failure 
but, instead, as making an important positive contribution to development.
10
 The 
prevailing wisdom in international institutions such as the United Nations and 
International Labour Organization, which are concerned with promoting the social 
dimension of development, is that managed migration in general and circular 
migration in particular can result in a triple win.
11
 Circular migration is seen as good 
for sending countries, for receiving countries, and for migrants. It is broadly defined 
as: 
migration experiences between an origin and destination involving more 
than  one migration and return. Effectively, it involves migrants sharing work, 
family, and other aspects of their lives between two or more locations.
12
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Well-designed and properly managed circular migration programmes are now seen as 
leading to a virtuous circle of benefits.  
Circular migration can give destination countries the flexibility to quickly 
overcome skills shortages while adapting to long-term labor market shifts. It 
can also serve to relieve labor surpluses in origin countries and provide the 
local economy with an influx of new skills and capital that migrants bring 
back with them. For the migrants, circular migration offers the opportunity to 




Of course, once properly managed circular migration is seen as pro-development the 
key issue becomes what does a ‘properly’ managed circular migration programme 
entail.  Advocates of migrants’ rights have been suspicious of circular migration, 
fearing that such programmes are simply revamped and modernized versions of the 
old, and discredited, guest worker programmes.
14
 The question for them is whether or 
not circular migration schemes can be squared with an emphasis on migrants’ rights.  
 
 
2.2  The EU’s Increasing Competence over Immigration 
 
After migration and asylum became an EU competence under the Treaty of 
Amsterdam (1997), the Tampere European Council (1999) called for the 
establishment of a common EU migration and asylum policy. This call marked the 
end of the EU’s opposition to labour migration from third countries. A new 
immigration strategy was needed to increase competitiveness in the EU in light of 
demographic changes and labour skill shortages. The Tampere European Council 
emphasized the need for rapid decisions on ‘the approximation of national legislation 
on the conditions for admission and residence of third country nationals based on a 
shared assessment of the economic and demographic developments within the Union 
as well as the situation in the countries of origin’.15 The focus was on ensuring that 
the European labour market functioned as efficiently as possible. However, another 
aim of this policy direction was to secure legal status for temporary workers who 
intended to return to their countries of origin, while at the same time providing a 
pathway leading eventually to a permanent status for those who wish to stay and who 
meet certain criteria. The idea was that admitted workers should also be provided with 
broadly the same rights and responsibilities as EU nationals in a progressive manner 
related to length of stay.
16
  
These aspirations regarding labour migration were part of an overall ambition to 
develop a common EU policy on asylum and migration.
17
 The Commission’s first 
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proposal to regulate labour migration
18
 was characterized by uniform admission rules 
intended to replace national labour migration schemes.
19
 However, Member States did 
not share the desire for harmonized admission rules, and the requirement for 
unanimity on the Council for the adoption of legislation governing immigration 
admission provisions helps to explain the Commission’s decision to retreat. Since 
Member States jealously guarded admission to their territory, the result was that very 
few instruments directly related to admission requirements were adopted.
20
 
With the coming into effect of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009, the ordinary 
legislative procedure became the route for immigration legislation, which enhanced 
the ability of the EU institutions to adopt immigration legislation. But in order to 
adopt instruments that pertain to immigration controls, EU institutions must over 
come their own divisions over immigration. The Parliament and Commission take a 
more liberal view than the Council, which has a more restrictive approach to 
immigration and traditionally prioritizes the management of irregular migration 
management and border control. For this reason, soft instruments such as Mobility 
Partnerships proliferate when it comes to promoting development through migration 
since hard instruments are difficult to agree upon.  
A further complication for linking migration more tightly to development at the EU 
level is that the Directorate-General (DG) Home Affairs is responsible for new 
legislative proposals on immigration, whereas DG Development and Co-operation-
Europeaid are responsible for development cooperation. The difficulty in coordinating 
different EU institutions in an area as politically contentious as immigration combines 
with the fact that development is distributed to different policy areas to undermine the 





3   THE EVOLUTION OF THE EU’S APPROACH TO 
MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT  
 
Although the first official reference to the development dimension of migration dates 
back to the conclusions of the 1999 Tampere European Council, it was not until 2005 
that this linkage gained momentum.
22
 The EU’s approach to the migration 
development nexus can be broken into two stages. The first begins with the Global 
Approach to Migration (GAM), which was adopted in 2005, and it focused mainly on 
the economic dimension of development.
23
 The second dates to 2011, when the GAM 
was renamed the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM), and it 
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emphasizes the contribution that migration can make to the social dimension of 
development.
24
  Although different in emphasis, both documents were provoked by 
humanitarian incidents that undermined the legitimacy of the EU’s approach to 
migration.  
 
In September 2005, the killing of six African migrants, who along with hundreds of 
their compatriots, were attempting to cross into the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and 
Melilla in hope of reaching the EU’s shores, provoked a major outcry within media 
and civil society. This tragedy reinforced the view that Europe was fortifying its 
borders against the citizens of its neighbouring states, many of which were former 
colonies. The outcry led to immediate action as the Heads of State and Government 
adopted a comprehensive approach, called the Global Approach to Migration, with 
the goal of managing migration flows in an effective manner and in genuine 
partnership with third countries.
25
 Priority actions based on an integrated approach 
were to be focused on Africa and the Mediterranean. In 2006, a Commission 
Communication outlined a thematic programme for the cooperation with third 
countries in the areas of migration and asylum.
26
 This approach was intended to 
respond to ‘the need for integrating migration and asylum issues into the Community 
policies of cooperation and development,’ to assist the Community better to match 





By linking migration with development, the EU was also seeking to reduce 
undocumented migration. The belief was that the promotion of economic prosperity 
through ‘closer trade cooperation, development assistance and conflict prevention’ 
would reduce ‘the underlying causes of migration flows.’28 Circular migration was 
also seen as reinforcing the goal of stopping irregular migration; the assumption is 
that ‘offering short- or medium-term employment contracts will forestall potential 
migrants from considering irregular ways of entering and residing in the territory of 
an EU Member State’.29 Moreover, circular migration was also regarded as creating 
an incentive for sending states to shoulder more responsibility for halting the flow of 
irregular migration.  
 
At the same time as the EU was developing an approach to migration that emphasized 
its connection with development, the Commission adopted a new strategy, one which 
targeted specific classes of immigrants, to further its ambition to adopt a policy plan 
for economic migration.
30
 After in-depth consultations with the Member States and 
other stakeholders, in 2005 it presented a policy plan for legal migration, stressing 
that certain sectors were already experiencing substantial labour and skill shortages 
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that could not be filled within the national labour markets and citing Eurostat 
projections of even worse shortages in the future.
31
 The Commission underlined the 
possibility that the admission of third-country nationals in one Member State might 




The 2005 package only addressed the conditions of, and the procedures of admission 
for, the entry and residence of four types of migrants: highly skilled workers; seasonal 
workers; intra-corporate transferees; and remunerated trainees.
33
 Seasonal workers 
were considered to be regularly needed in certain sectors, mainly agriculture, 
building, and tourism. The goal of the proposal was to provide Member States with a 
supply of labour while at the same time granting secure legal status and regular work 
prospects to the immigrants concerned, and thereby protecting a particularly 
vulnerable category of workers, as well as contributing to the development of the 
countries of origin.
34
 The Commission argued that even with high unemployment, few 
EU citizens and residents were willing to engage in seasonal activities and, thus, 
admitting this category of immigrant workers would rarely conflict with the goal of 
employing EU workers
35
 This discussion began to draw closer with the Commission’s 
new approach to cultivating the links between migration and development since the 
proposed directive for seasonal workers envisaged repeat migration.
36
 According to 
the Commission, such circular migration could contribute to the development of the 
country of origin.  
In 2008, the European Council adopted the European Pact on Immigration and 
Asylum and in 2009 the Stockholm Programme reiterated the Commission and 
Council’s commitment to implementing the Policy Plan on Legal Migration.37 This 
was the context in which the Commission proposed a text for a directive on seasonal 
employment in 2010.
38
   
In the meantime, under the banner of GAM, in 2007, the EU launched the Mobility 
Partnerships, which emphasized circular migration with neigbouring countries. The 
Communication regarded mobility partnerships, which are political non-binding 
statements, as a way of fostering circular migration.
39
 These Partnerships are entered 
into between the EU and individual third countries, and EU Member States participate 
on an opt-in basis.  Although called ‘partnerships’, these agreements reflect highly 
unequal power relationships in which the EU sets the rules of the game and third 
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countries abide by these rules.
40
 They are intended to facilitate the access of these 
nationals to Member States’ labour markets through admission quotas and more 
favourable treatment regarding the admission of certain categories of migrants.
41
 
However, the Communication from the Commission on the Mobility Partnerships 
made it clear that the goal of these agreements were mixed.  On the one hand, they 
were seen as a way of ‘exploiting potential positive impacts of migration on 
development and responding to the needs of countries of origin in terms of skill 
transfers and of mitigating the impact of brain drain’.42 On the other, Partnership 
Agreements would be used ‘to identify novel approaches to improve the management 
of legal movements of people between the EU and third countries ready to make 
significant efforts to fight illegal migration’.43 
 
In 2011, the Arab spring and events in the Southern Mediterranean revealed the need 
for a coherent and comprehensive migration policy for the EU.
44
 That year, the 
Commission announced the EU’s ‘Global Approach to Migration and Mobility 
(GAMM),’ ‘which places mobility of third country nationals at its centre,’  ‘makes 
partnerships more sustainable and forward-looking’ and emphasizes human rights as a 




The GAMM’s four pillars – 1. legal migration and mobility, 2. irregular migration 
and trafficking in human beings, 3. international protection and asylum policy, and 4. 
maximizing the development impact of migration and mobility – are regarded as 
mutually supporting. According to the Commission:  
If the EU is to engage more systematically in facilitating and managing 
migration and mobility, this latter aspect should be visible in the pillars on 
legal migration and on migration and development. Addressing trafficking in 
human beings is of key importance and should be a visible dimension of the 
pillar on irregular migration.
46
  
The need for a comprehensive approach to migration and mobility was seen as 
justifying the elevation of the profile of international protection and asylum to one of 
the GAMM’s pillars. The GAMM was also embedded in the EU’s foreign policy and 
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Significantly, the GAMM is expressly migrant-centred, and it emphasizes that ‘the 
human rights of migrants are a cross-cutting dimension’.48 The Commission stressed 
that ‘respect for the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU is a key component of 
EU policies on migration’ and that ‘the impact on fundamental rights of initiatives 
taken in the context of the GAMM must be thoroughly assessed’.49  
 
Framework agreements were divided into two types, which depend upon the physical 
proximity of the third-country to the EU. Mobility Partnerships were limited to the 
EU's immediate ‘neighbourhood’, with Tunisia, Morocco and Egypt identified as 
priorities
50
 The Commission emphasized that under the GAMM mobility partnerships 
would focus on facilitating and organizing legal migration, effective and humane 
measures to address irregular migration, and concrete steps towards reinforcing the 
development outcomes of migration. For other countries, the Commission proposed to 
set up Common Agendas on Migration and Mobility, which ‘would constitute an 
advanced level of cooperation, based on a number of common recommendations, 
targets and commitments for dialogue and cooperation.’51  
 
The GAMM also placed migration and mobility in the context of the Europe 2020 
Strategy aim to contribute to the vitality and competitiveness of the EU, emphasizing 
evolving demographic and economic changes make migration and mobility a priority. 
The GAMM’s distinctive feature is the extent to which it stressed the urgency of the 
‘need to improve the effectiveness of policies aiming at integration of migrants into 
the labour market.’ 52  The potential for a more demand-driven legal immigration 
policy combined with the portability of social and pension rights were identified as 
specific measures that would facilitate circular migration while simultaneously 
creating a disincentive for irregular work. Moreover, the GAMM specifically referred 
to the Directive on Seasonal Workers, emphasizing that the ‘proposal includes 
protection from exploitation and is of relevance for many partner countries, especially 
in agriculture and tourism.’53 Here the explicit intersection of EU hard immigration 
law with its softer development agenda is evident. 
 
In a subsequent communication about migration and development, the Commission 
acknowledged the importance of providing potential migrants with information about 
immigration procedures, their rights, and the economic and social conditions in the 
intended country.
54
 This rights-based approach to temporary migration coincided with 
EU Member States’ traditional approach of granting migrants equal treatment under 
national laws and the EU’s robust anti-discrimination laws.55  However, precisely 
what placing migrants’ rights at the centre of the GAMM entails in concrete terms is 
unclear. As yet, no EU Member State has ratified the UN Convention on the 
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Protection of the Rights of Migrant Workers and their Families, and only a few have 
ratified either of the ILO’s two migrant workers conventions.56  
 
Moreover, what the EU’s commitment to circular migration in the GAMM actually 
entails is vague. According to Wickramaskara, ‘despite the rhetoric on mobility and 
migration linkages, the fact remains that there are very limited opportunities for third 




4  SEASONAL WORKERS DIRECTIVE  
 
Although the initial proposal for a seasonal workers directive was introduced before 
the GAMM was adopted, the negotiations overlapped with the new rights-based 
approach to migration and mobility. Thus, the adopted Directive provides an excellent 
opportunity to assess the EU’s success in linking migration and development, 
promoting circular migration, and protecting migrant’s rights.58  
 
The Directive sets out rules for the entry and stay for seasonal workers who are not 
EU citizens, although each Member State retains the right to determine the numbers 
of seasonal workers admitted to its territory.
59
 The Directive gives Member States a 
great deal of flexibility to determine which sectors are seasonal, and only 
contemplates a limited role for the social partners, although recital 13 notes that 
agriculture, horticulture and tourism are likely to include seasonal activities.
60
 It seeks 
to respond to the needs of Member States for a source of labour to fill the low skill, 
seasonal, and, typically, precarious, jobs, that are not attractive to EU residents and 
citizens, while simultaneously minimizing the possibility of ‘economic and social 
exploitation’ of the third-country migrant workers by providing them with the set of 
rights, including the employment rights, to which resident seasonal workers are 
entitled. At the same time, the Directive is designed to promote circular migration and 
to ensure that these low-skilled workers do not become permanent residents of the 
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4.1  Development and Circular Migration 
When discussing the linkage between migration and development, the Commission 
made it clear that the Directive was designed to complement, and not to replace, 
multilateral partnership agreements and bilateral agreements between the EU and/or 
one or more Member States, on the one hand, and third countries on the other. The 
only requirement is that the agreement ‘adopt or retain more favourable provisions for 
third-country nationals’ (Article 4). Member States can continue to give priority to 
migrant workers from specific third countries so long as the bilateral or multilateral 
agreements are more favourable to the migrant workers than the terms set out in the 
Directive. Here the development goals combined with Member States’ desire for a 
reliable and efficient source of seasonal labour through partnership agreements. 
However, the Directive prevents Member States from admitting seasonal workers 
through other temporary migration schemes.  
 
Despite this gesture to development, the Commission’s commitment to circular 
migration suffered during the negotiation process. Initially, it proposed a multi-
seasonal permit option, which would have allowed for the issuance of three permits 
covering three seasons, arguing that this provision would not only promote the EU’s 
development goals, but also that it would help to cultivate a stable and trained 
workforce for EU employers.
62
 But, the problem was that the Commission’s proposal 
affected the ability of Member States to control their borders and, therefore, was not 
acceptable.  
In the end, the provisions that were adopted governing re-entry are weaker and they 
leave much more to the discretion of Member States. Although Article 16 requires 
Member States to facilitate the re-entry of migrant workers who have been admitted 
to that Member State at least once during the previous five years, the means of 
facilitating re-entry are completely within the discretion of the Member State. Article 
16 lists four measures that Member States may adopt in order to facilitate the re-entry 
of seasonal workers, but it is unclear what mechanisms Member States must put in 
place to facilitate circular migration since these measures are part of a non-exhaustive 
list (‘may include one or more such measures’) and they are not expressed as 
minimum requirements. Thus, what began as a commitment to promoting the 
circulation of third-country national seasonal workers became ‘the possibility of 
facilitated admission’ (recital 34). 
4.2  A Rights-Based Approach: Equal Treatment and Enforcement  
                                                                                                                                                              
within the EU was expected to become less and less available: COM(2010)379,  2-3. The agricultural 
sector in particular was earmarked as experiencing high job losses. Commission Staff Working 
document, Impact assessment accompanying the Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament 
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to which migrant workers already conducted work in the agricultural sector in the Member States, 
noting that a large proportion were irregular migrants. The directive would provide a route of lawful 
economic immigration for this group of seasonal workers and thus encourage legal, as opposed to 
irregular, migration. COM(2010)379, recital 6. 
62
 COM(2010)379, 3 and recital 17. In the Policy Plan for Legal Migration, COM(2005) 669, 7, the 
proposed seasonal workers directive contemplated a scheme which would propose a residence/work 
permit allowing the third-country national to work for a certain number of months per year for 4-5 
years. 
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Although the social dimension of the Directive is not immediately obvious from its 
title, when it was initially proposed the Commission claimed that combatting the 
exploitation of third-country seasonal migrant workers and protecting their rights was 
a key objective.
63
 But, the actual provisions in the initial proposal could not have 
achieved the goal of protecting seasonal migrant workers from economic and social 
exploitation. Not only was the initial version criticized by the ILO,
64
 it is likely that if 
it had been adopted it would have been in violation of basic human rights prohibition 
against of discrimination, such as the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.
65
  
The core of a rights-based approach to labour migration is the principle that migrants 
shall be entitled to equal treatment with nationals in the host state. The Commission’s 
original proposal did not provide for equal treatment on working conditions, and it 
was severely criticized in this respect by the ILO.
66
 However, the Council and the 
European Parliament agreed on equal treatment regarding working conditions, and the 
Parliament was able to strengthen this provision.
67
 Article 23 expressly embodies the 
equal treatment principle, providing that seasonal workers are to be treated equally to 
nationals at least with regard to nine enumerated categories of rights. The first 
paragraphs of Article 23 covers terms of employment, including the minimum 
working age, and working conditions, including pay and dismissal, working hours, 
leave and holidays, as well as health and safety requirements in the workplace. In its 
second paragraph, Article 23 provides for equal treatment with regard to the right to 
strike and freedom of association. 
The majority of the equal treatment entitlements specified in Article 23 have to do 
with various forms of social entitlements. Article 23.1.d provides that seasonal 
migrant workers are entitled to those branches of social security defined in Article 3 
of Regulation no.883/2004, which include sickness benefits, maternity and equivalent 
paternity benefits, invalidity benefits, old-age benefits, survivors’ benefits, benefits in 
respect of accidents at work and occupational diseases, death grants, unemployment 
benefits, pre-retirement benefits, and family benefits. The Council demanded 
limitations on entitlement to social benefits, and as a result Member States have the 
discretion to compromise the equal treatment of migrant workers when it comes to 
accessing family and unemployment benefits (Article 23.2 i).
68
 Thus, the equal 
treatment provisions in the Directive derogate from those in the two ILO migrant 
workers conventions since the latter include equal treatment of migrants and nationals 
specifically with respect to ‘unemployment and family responsibilities’ and more 
generally regarding ‘social security’. 69  However, Article 23.1, 2nd paragraph 
specifically provides that migrant seasonal workers are entitled to receive statutory 
pensions based on the seasonal workers’ previous employment and acquired in 
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accordance with the legislation set out in Article 3 of reg. 883/2004, when moving to 
a third country. This is an important step towards portability, which is critical for 
development-friendly circular migration.  
Seasonal workers are entitled to have the same access to goods and services and, with 
the exception of housing services, the supply of goods made available to the public 
(Article 23.1.e). In addition, migrant workers are, thanks to amendments proposed by 
the Parliament, entitled to equal treatment regarding education and vocational 
training; recognition of diplomas, certificates and other professional qualifications; 
and, in so far as the seasonal worker is deemed to be resident for tax purposes in the 
Member State concerned, tax benefits.
70
 Although the Commission and the Council 
also wanted to be able to exclude employment services from this Article, the 
Parliament was successful in ensuring that third country seasonal workers were 
granted equal access to any advisory services offered by employment services 
regarding seasonal work.
71
   
The European Parliament also managed to secure a provision on back payments to be 
made by the employers regarding outstanding remuneration to the third-country 
national.
72
 Combined with the robust equal treatment approach, the Directive goes a 
long way to achieving the kind of rights-based approach to migration advocated by 
the ILO in its Multilateral Framework on Labour Migration.
73
 
Ultimately, the value of any rights depends on whether they can be enforced.  
Enforcement is a particular challenge when it comes to third-country migrant seasonal 
workers; they are sojourners in the host country, without political rights and lacking 
the status of citizens, and their migrant status is tied to an on-going employment 
relationship with the employer who sponsored them, making them particularly 
vulnerable to abuse. An enforcement mechanism must address the various dimensions 
of seasonal migrant workers’ vulnerability if it is to be effective. Thus, a multi-faceted 
approach to enforcement is critical.  
The ability of migrant workers to change employers is regarded as a key factor in 
whether or not they can actually enforce in practice the rights to which they are 
entitled to on paper.
74
 There was a deep conflict between the Council and European 
Parliament over whether or not seasonal workers should have the right to change 
employers. The Council did not want Member States to be required under any 
circumstances to permit migrant workers to change employers, whereas the European 
Parliament wanted migrant workers to have this right.
75
 In the end, there was a 
compromise. Article 15 includes a number of provisions that give seasonal workers 
some flexibility over the length of their stay in a Member State and that loosen the 
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closeness of their ties to their employers.
76
  
The European Parliament also succeeded in requiring Member States to ensure that 
mechanisms for monitoring, assessing, and inspecting whether or not employers are in 
compliance with the national instruments transposing the Directive.
77
 In addition, it 




The only way the EU institutions were able to come to agreement on sanctions against 
employers who violated the conditions imposed by the Directive was by constructing 
these provisions as a mix of obligatory and optional clauses.
79
 However, a critical 
provision for migrant workers is Article (17.2), which goes beyond sanctioning the 
employer to require the employer to compensate migrant workers in situations in 
which the employer’s work authorization is withdrawn for reasons that range from 
insolvency and employing undocumented workers to violating labour laws or working 
conditions. This provision minimizes the possibility that sanctions against employers 
will have the result of harming migrant seasonal workers.
80
 
5  CONCLUSION   
Despite the Commission’s claim that its goal was to establish a structure for avoiding 
the exploitation of third-country seasonal migrant workers, the substantive provisions 
of its original proposal were so severely flawed that they call into question the 
sincerity of this ambition. In part the failure to attend to migrants’ rights was due to 
the treaty basis selected for the Directive. While using the immigration base under 
Article 79 (TFEU) meant that the ordinary legislative process was available and thus a 
directive was more likely to be adopted, it also meant that the Directorate-General 
responsible for the directive was Home Affairs, one that was not familiar with 
workers rights.
81
 In fact, Home Affairs tends to be preoccupied with border control 
and security rather than the social dimensions of migration. However, during the 
negotiations the other EU institutions, especially the Parliament, with the assistance of 
the ILO, managed to obtain a Directive that was much more compatible with the 
migrant-centred and rights-based approach to migration articulated in the GAMM. 
The Directive that was ultimately adopted is much more likely to be effective than the 
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original proposal in preventing labour and social exploitation. The European 
Parliament was, often with the support of the Council, largely successful in ensuring 
that the Directive embodied an approach of treating migrant seasonal workers the 
same as national workers.  
However, the extent to which an equal treatment approach actually protects seasonal 
workers from exploitation depends upon two factors: the terms and conditions 
available to national workers in sectors designated as seasonal and the enforcement 
mechanisms available to them. With respect to the first, it is important to recall that 
Member States have found it necessary to recruit workers from third-countries 
because neither their national workers nor EU citizens have found seasonal work to be 
attractive. One of the limitations of an equal treatment approach is that if a Member 
State provides low standards for national workers in sectors that are designated 
seasonal, such as is often the case with the agricultural sector,
82
 all that migrants 
workers are entitled to is equally poor treatment. Moreover, as is the case with the two 
ILO migrant workers conventions, there is nothing in the Directive that prevents a 
Member State from tying a migrant worker’s legal status to be in its territory to an on-
going employment relationship with the sponsoring employer, a linkage which makes 
the migrant worker vulnerable to abuse.
83
 Regarding the second factor, while the 
European Parliament was successful in introducing a range of enforcement 
mechanisms into the Directive, some are discretionary rather than mandatory. The 
legislative style used in the Directive gives Member States a great deal of flexibility 
in designing admission and enforcement regimes. The actual terms and conditions and 
legal rights to which seasonal migrant workers will be entitled, as well as how these 
conditions and rights will be enforced, remain within the purview of the Member 
States. But, even with these shortcomings, this Directive has the potential to promote 
the protection of third-country migrant seasonal workers while they are working in 
the EU.  
However, by contrast with the extent to which migrants’ rights were enhanced, the 
Commission’s goal of promoting the circular migration of seasonal workers was 
severely compromised during the negotiations
84
 Instead of providing for multi-
seasonal permits, all the Directive requires Member States to do is to ‘facilitate’, in a 
manner entirely within their own discretion, the re-entry of migrant workers who have 
been admitted to the Member State at least once during the previous five years. The 
failure of Member States to commit to repeat entries by the same migrant undermines 
the possibility of truly circular migration, and makes it much more difficult for 
migrant workers to develop longer-term life projects. Such instability is likely to 
undermine the development potential of the Directive.  
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Moreover, the highly-publicised drowning of hundreds of migrants in the 
Mediterranean who were fleeing Libya has reinforced the European Union’s 
commitment to strengthening border control. Both the Council, in its 23 April 2015 
response to the tragedy, and the Commission, in its European Agenda on Migration, 
which was released 13 May 2015, emphasized the need to crackdown on migrant 
smugglers who are exploiting desperate migrants.
85
 This emphasis will likely shift the 
priority of the Directorate-General of Migration and Home Affairs away from the 
development goals of migration towards policing borders. In fact, of the four pillars 
identified by Commission in its migration agenda, a new policy on legal migration 
was the last to be mentioned.
86
 Maximizing the development goals for countries of 
origin was the final item identified in the Agenda. Once again, Mobility Partnerships 
took centre stage in the attempt to mainstream migration issues into key development 
sectors, although the Commission did note that it will ‘make available at least EUR 30 
million to support partners with capacity building on effective management of labour 
migration, focusing on migrant workers and tackling exploitation’.87  However, it 
made no explicit reference to the Seasonal Workers Directive. The extent to which the 
Directive will establish a better floor for Mobility Partnerships and provide fast, 
effective, and protective procedures for admitting and regulating migrant workers will 
depend upon the political will of Members States since they have such a great deal of 
flexibility when it comes to how to transpose it.  
The unwillingness of Member States to commit to truly circular migration 
programmes for workers who are considered low skilled is attributable to their desire 
to maintain control over entry to their territories. There are political, as well as 
economic, reasons why Member States do not want to dilute their sovereignty over 
immigration control. This unwillingness accounts for the lengthy period (thirty 
months) that Members States insisted upon for transposing the Directive.
88
 By failing 
to commit to any real form of circular migration for seasonal workers who are clearly 
in demand in the EU, Member States have signaled that they prefer a disposable 
workforce to do Europe’s dirty work, rather than providing an on-going commitment 
to seasonal migrants upon which sustainable development can be based.  
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